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October 9, 2024 N E- 92/25

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Dear Colleagues,

We wish to extend our deepest gratitude to the European Association of Judges for its steadfast support, particularly in light of the significant statements made regarding Armenia on June 2, 2023, in Athens, and the EAJ board's letter dated July 14, 2023. It is noteworthy that the report has garnered widespread attention among both local and international organizations, having been cited in various resolutions that highlight its importance and impact.

Regrettably, there are clear signs of a troubling lack of improvement in the situation. In fact, conditions have deteriorated, marked by a disturbing rise in the unjust removal of judges through disciplinary proceedings that contravene international standards and best practices. Recent legislative changes have further undermined judicial independence, creating a chilling effect within the Armenian judiciary. As a result, many judges feel pressured to conform to the politicized directives of the Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council.

We continue to seek your ongoing support and guidance as we navigate these challenges. Over the past year, the landscape of judicial independence in Armenia has deteriorated significantly. Particularly since the fall of 2023, a new wave of concerning developments has emerged, further compromising the integrity of the judiciary. The key issues contributing to this regression include:

1. Politicization of Judicial Appointments in the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC)

We have previously raised concerns regarding the politicization of appointments, particularly in the election of non-judicial (academic) members of SJC (see letters E-8/29 from May 16, 2023, and E-8/31 from July 7, 2023). The SJC, consisting of ten members—five judges elected by the General Assembly and five

appointed by Parliament—suffers from a lack of transparency in its selection process, which fails to adhere to merit-based criteria.

This opacity has led to the rapid appointment of individuals with political affiliations to high-ranking judicial positions, bypassing a mandatory cooling-off period and allowing executive influence to penetrate the judiciary. Additionally, the SJC's current formation fails to meet the standards of a "tribunal established by law," as evidenced by irregularities in the appointments of members such as Karen Andreasyan, Yeranuhi Tumanyants, and Hayk Grigoryan, who do not meet the qualifications mandated by the Judicial Code. The nomination process has been politicized, with the ruling party dominating appointments while the parliamentary opposition is sidelined, further undermining the SJC's independence. The forced resignations that have created vacancies also contribute to this politicization.

Another critical issue is the close connection between Minister of Justice Grigor Minasyan, who has initiated disciplinary actions against judges, and SJC Chairman Karen Andreasyan. These ties raise significant concerns about the impartiality of the SJC, eroding trust in judicial independence and exposing judges to arbitrary reprisals. Furthermore, in 2023, the combined income from a joint business venture between Grigor Minasyan and Karen Andreasyan's wife, Yeva Arakelyan, exceeded their official annual state salaries by more than threefold.

The politicized practice of appointing non-judicial members has now extended to judicial appointments within the SJC. Judicial members elected by the General Assembly of Judges have been coerced into resigning, while new elections are being manipulated. Additionally, further restrictions have been imposed on judges' participation, weakening the integrity of the judiciary.

One striking example is the termination of the mandate of Arshak Vardanyan, a recently elected judicial member, after only about a year of service. Elected on April 7, 2023, Vardanyan faced pressure from Karen Andreasyan, who sought to influence the election in favor of another candidate, R.M. To force Vardanyan's resignation, illegally obtained private correspondence was used. Similarly, three other acting judges—one from the Court of Cassation (S.M.) and two from the Criminal Court of Appeal—were forced to resign under similar circumstances. Following these resignations, R.M. was appointed as a judge of the Court of Cassation, replacing S.M..

Karen Andreasyan's interference also extends to the election process within the General Assembly of Judges. Under his direction, the Judicial Department, responsible for managing the nomination and election of judicial members, failed to inform all eligible judges about vacant positions, depriving them of the opportunity to be nominated. Consequently, the current SJC judicial members—Kristine Mkoyan, Artur Atabekyan, Mery Hambarzumyan, and Armen Danielyan—were elected under non-competitive conditions, with only one pre-agreed nominee for each position. These appointments further highlight the lack of transparency and competitive selection in the process.

On July 19, 2023, the General Assembly of Judges, the sole legitimate body of judicial self-governance, took a stand to defend judicial independence by rejecting an agenda imposed by the SJC Chairman that contradicted both the Constitution and principles of judicial independence. Key points raised during this assembly include:

- The General Assembly, as the constitutionally established body of judicial self-governance, bears responsibility for ensuring effective court management.
- The Judicial Department, which lacks independence and exists to serve the judiciary, attempted to improperly interpret and predetermine the SJC formation process by notifying only regional court judges, excluding eligible judges from the Yerevan Criminal Court.
- The Judicial Department does not have the authority to dictate or interpret the SJC formation procedure, thus restricting judges' ability to participate in the process.
- A proposal was passed to draft a measure allowing the General Assembly to recall any SJC judicial member who fails to uphold judicial independence or performs ineffectively.

Despite this clear expression of opposition from the General Assembly, another assembly was convened on August 4 with the same rejected agenda, without discussion or justification. Prior to this assembly, judges faced threats of disciplinary action, suspension, and removal from promotion lists, pressuring them to attend and vote for the preferred agenda. These threats were coordinated by Karen Andreyan, who directed Judicial Department employees to record judges' attendance and voting using multiple cameras, limiting their freedom to express dissent.

Notably, the majority of judges ultimately approved the election procedure, despite the fact that judges from the Yerevan courts had not been informed of the vacancy and were thus unable to self-nominate. As a result, E.Hovhannisyan from the regional courts was elected on August 4, in violation of established procedures. Fewer than 20 judges reaffirmed their opposition to the procedure under these coercive conditions and are now facing persecution, including termination of their powers.

2. Premature Termination of Judges' Powers to Facilitate SJC Members' Promotion at Higher Courts

A concerning trend has emerged in Armenia where the powers of judges from higher courts are being prematurely terminated to make way for members of the SJC as their tenure approaches its end. One notable example is the case of SJC member Naira Hovsepyan, who voted for the termination of the powers of Tigran Petrosyan and Artak Barseghyan, both judges from the Court of Cassation. Following these terminations, Hovsepyan herself became a potential candidate for appointment as a judge of the Court of Cassation.

On October 25, 2023, the matter of selecting a judge for the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation was brought before the National Assembly. Among the three candidates presented for the position was SJC member Naira Hovsepyan. A total of 67 out of 107 deputies participated in the vote, with all 67 votes cast in her favor coming from deputies of the ruling "Civil Contract" faction. On October 30, 2023, Naira Hovsepyan was officially appointed as a judge of the Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation through Presidential Decree NH-342-A. A similar situation unfolded with SJC member Artur Atabekyan, who also benefitted from this process.

As the terms of acting non-judicial SJC members Vigen Kocharyan and Hayk Grigoryan are approaching their end, the SJC has included their names in the promotion list for the Court of Cassation, suggesting that this institution is more interested in personal advancement than in upholding the integrity within the judiciary.

3. Sub-Legislative Acts Imposing Reporting Requirements on Judges and Expanding the Powers of Court Presidents and the Judicial Department, Along with Arbitrary Investigations into Judges' Conduct

Recent sub-legislative acts have granted court presidents and the Judicial Department expanded powers, ostensibly to improve case management. Judges are now required to submit daily reports on their work, and in some cases, on their personal lives, under the pretext of ensuring timely case handling and maintaining work discipline¹. However, these measures often function as covert instructions, effectively dictating how judges should rule in specific cases, thereby undermining judicial independence.

The Judicial Department has also been given broad authority to conduct investigations into judges' conduct, framed as efforts to "study judicial practices." These investigations frequently serve as pretexts for monitoring judges and preparing disciplinary cases against them, fostering a culture of fear and self-censorship. This constant scrutiny erodes judicial independence, as judges operate under the ongoing threat of punitive actions.

Since late 2023, these expanded reporting requirements have blurred the boundaries between judges' professional duties and personal privacy. The obligation to submit frequent reports places undue pressure on judges, infringing on their ability to work independently.

¹ <https://court.am/storage/uploads/files/bdx-decisions/OS8xkc8rrMDWreVZ2k524f4q3xDhd05qWQALTzLi.pdf>

Through normative decisions made by the SJC, internal rules governing work discipline have further restricted judges' independence. These rules not only require judges to report to court presidents but also mandate adherence to strict timelines for case processing. The result is a robust control mechanism imposed by both the Judicial Department and court presidents. Judges, under threat of disciplinary action, are compelled to comply.

A particularly controversial provision in a draft SJC decision even proposed setting standards for the facial hair of male judges—a measure ultimately scrapped after media coverage sparked public outcry².

These mechanisms, which compromise judicial independence, are unprecedented among member states of the Council of Europe. Even within Armenia's own law enforcement and prosecutorial bodies, no such invasive controls exist, despite the more procedural and hierarchical nature of those institutions. Applying similar hierarchical principles to the judiciary risks eroding its independence and creating a culture of subordination.

International organizations have consistently raised concerns about this issue. Over a decade ago, resolutions and strategies adopted in line with Armenia's international obligations recommended the complete abandonment of hierarchical management models within the judiciary, particularly the disproportionate role played by court presidents.

In another worrying development, the Judicial Department—based on SJC decisions regarding indicative deadlines for case hearings—has been issuing imperatives to judges³. These demands include meeting deadlines, following specific instructions, and providing information. Failure to comply with these directives has resulted in disciplinary proceedings, and in some cases, the termination of judicial powers. This has created a chilling effect, subjecting many judges to these unlawful demands. The reforms painstakingly achieved in the post-Soviet period are being rolled back, threatening to return the judiciary to a time when its independence was significantly compromised.

4. Politically Motivated Disciplinary Actions and Extrajudicial Influence on Judges

The SJC, under the leadership of Chairman Karen Andreasyan, continues to use disciplinary actions to target independent judges, often employing extrajudicial methods to influence judicial proceedings. This has intensified since a chilling effect silenced many active judges. Recent tactics have become increasingly aggressive, fostering a climate of fear and forcing many judges to remain silent.

In July 2024, **Judge Artur Stepanyan**, who also served as Vice President of the Armenian Association of Judges, was subjected to an unprecedented and individualized audit. This complex audit scrutinized four years of his judicial activity (2018–2022) to identify delays in the publication of court decisions—a widespread administrative issue within the judiciary. The audit was initiated by an NGO closely affiliated with the government, whose president had lost a case presided over by Judge Stepanyan. The audit extended beyond the NGO's chartered purposes and permissible activities but was nonetheless used as a basis to initiate disciplinary proceedings, ultimately leading to the termination of Judge Stepanyan's judicial powers.

Compounding this unfairness, Judge Stepanyan was not given the opportunity to challenge additional charges introduced by the SJC in its final decision. These charges were not part of the initial case brought by the Ministry of Justice and were not discussed during the SJC's proceedings. Under Article 142 § 6(2) of Armenia's Judicial Code, a 'serious disciplinary offense' is defined as a breach of judicial responsibilities that renders a judge incompatible with their office. According to Article 152, the SJC must examine disciplinary charges strictly within the scope initiated by the competent authority, in this case, the Ministry of Justice. This legal framework ensures that the SJC cannot unilaterally expand the scope of disciplinary charges.

² <https://factor.am/703654.html>

³ <https://court.am/hy/decisions-single/931>

In Judge Stepanyan's case, the Ministry of Justice initially categorized the delayed publication of judgments as a standard disciplinary offense. However, contrary to the Ministry of Justice's position, the SJC, acting on its own, reclassified Judge Stepanyan's actions as a 'serious disciplinary breach' in its final decision. This reclassification, which ultimately led to the termination of his judicial powers, was not discussed during the hearings. Judge Stepanyan only learned of this new qualification from the final decision, meaning he had no opportunity to defend himself against the reclassification—a violation of his right to a fair hearing.

The unfairness of the proceedings stems from the key facts that the SJC exceeded its legal authority by stepping beyond the original charges brought, and Judge Stepanyan was not given the chance to defend himself against this reclassification, which had never been raised during the trial.

The SJC's finding of a 'serious disciplinary offense' was crucial, as it directly led to the termination of Judge Stepanyan's powers. Without this new finding, the SJC would not have had the legal grounds to impose such a severe sanction. Moreover, the SJC relied on evidence collected *ex officio* and used in deliberations without presenting it during the disciplinary hearings. It also considered a previous disciplinary sanction that had already expired. These actions further undermined the fairness of the process.

Similarly, **Judge Anna Danibekyan** was unlawfully suspended and later dismissed following a disciplinary proceeding initiated after a media campaign orchestrated by SJC Chairman Karen Andreasyan. Andreasyan publicly vowed to hold the judge accountable in a Facebook post and later stated on national TV that he had instructed the Judicial Department to prepare a video. This video, which highlighted five high-profile cases, was subsequently broadcast by various media outlets.

The disciplinary action against Judge Danibekyan was launched based on this video, which was created under Andreasyan's directive. During the SJC hearing, it was explicitly stated that the decision was linked to the notoriety of the case she was handling. Notably, the judge was not allowed to present her defense during the hearing, where she was expected to deliver her defense speech. Unrepresented by a lawyer, she had notified the SJC of a five-minute delay; however, the proceedings continued in her absence, resulting in the case being closed in under five minutes. Her request to reopen the case was denied solely due to that delay, despite her absence and was stated in final decision, that the timely commencement of a hearing is an international requirement. The statement was made in circumstances where previous hearings in the same case had started with delays of up to 10 minutes.

At the same time, another disciplinary proceeding was initiated against **Judge Vahe Misakyan**, one of the judges defamed in the "Top 5 Cases" video prepared at the directive of Karen Andreasyan. This proceeding was launched under the pretext of delays in the trial of another case. During the process, Andreasyan posed politically charged questions to the judge, such as, "If you're not involved in politics, is politics involved with you?" He also initiated a media campaign against the judge. While the final decision had yet to be published and consultations were still ongoing, Andreasyan posted biased statements on his personal TikTok account, predicting the outcome and commenting on the judge's case with remarks like, "Misakyan is accused of delaying the case," and "Who is responsible for the delay in the case?" This behavior constituted self-promotion, which is prohibited by both national and international standards.

Notably, Judge Misakyan was accused of violating ethical rules solely for delays in the case, despite no trial participants having raised this issue as a concern. He had also voted against Andreasyan's instructions during the General Assembly of Judges in August 2024.

It is essential to highlight that all cases were initiated by Minister of Justice Grigor Minasyan, who is closely aligned with Andreasyan both economically and ideologically⁴.

It is essential to highlight that, under the influence of Karen Andreasyan, the SJC consistently fails to protect judges' rights to public hearings and the right to be heard in disciplinary proceedings. Even after a

⁴ Grigor Minasyan submitted his resignation in early October.

Constitutional Court ruling that identified violations of these fundamental rights, the SJC refuses to reconsider cases, often using procedures that are not grounded in law. The Council continues to conduct hearings behind closed doors, frequently denying judges the opportunity to adequately present their defense. These practices significantly undermine judicial independence and due process.

The Constitutional Court ruling was made on May 21, 2024⁵ in the case of **Davit Harutyunyan**, which had been addressed in a European Association of Judges (EAJ) resolution adopted in Athens on April 2, 2023, and further raised in a letter from the EAJ Council to Armenian authorities in July. The Constitutional Court explicitly stated that "Shadow justice" had taken place, violating Judge Harutyunyan's rights to a public hearing and the right to be heard. The court also noted that his case required review in accordance with the law. It was also stated that the Council must, in every case, show respect towards the judge during disciplinary proceedings, commensurate with the judge's high status.

Despite these clear constitutional directives, the SJC has refused to review the case at the judge's request. Instead, it continues to rely on written and closed procedures that deviate from both current legislation and established practices, in what appears to be an inexplicable process.

The cumulative effect of these actions has severely damaged public trust in the judiciary. Judges are increasingly forced to conform to political pressures to avoid retaliation, creating an environment where judicial independence is compromised. The judiciary's role as a neutral arbiter is undermined, eroding the foundation of the rule of law and democracy in Armenia.

The previous actions have not gone unnoticed. The legal community in Armenia, along with the general public and international organizations, has expressed growing concern over the SJC's activities and its handling of disciplinary proceedings. This concern has been echoed in recent reports by Freedom House⁶ and the United States Department of State⁷.

5. Legislative Proposals Weakening the Judicial System

Building on the concerns mentioned above, it is important to outline the legislative proposals currently under discussion, which further threaten judicial independence in Armenia. The Ministry of Justice has submitted a constitutional law package titled "Making Supplements and Amendments to the Judicial Code of the Republic of Armenia" to the Venice Commission. The Ministry justifies the draft as a means to ensure proper and equal evaluation of the performance of judges. However, the proposed changes contradict both domestic and international standards, as well as the state's obligations to uphold judicial independence.

Key Issues with the Draft Law:

1. **Frequent Evaluations:** The draft proposes that judges with at least two years of experience be evaluated every two years. The Association of Judges argues that such a short timeframe imposes unacceptable constant oversight, subjecting judges to the influence of non-independent bodies responsible for these evaluations.
2. **Composition and Formation of the Performance and Evaluation Commission:** The proposed law envisions a Commission composed of 10 judges and 15 non-judicial members. This composition is unacceptable because the evaluation of judges should be carried out primarily, if not exclusively, by fellow judges. Moreover, the SJC, under the leadership of Karen Andreyan, a politically affiliated

⁵ https://concourt.am/decision/decisions/6650ab4cd2b72_sdv-1729.pdf?fbclid=IwY2xjawF1xvRleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHU9YFjdItoz8QQzxIwKmaITR_yjXI9Z9RJOSVEHsZC-Cpk_x4bWNqSbUQA_aem_Y4H7gfJYUM43WXwee1OpgQ

⁶ <https://rb.gy/3zgeer>

⁷ <https://rb.gy/ffz6z8>

figure, would be responsible for forming the Commission. This further jeopardizes judicial independence, as the SJC has already been criticized for its lack of impartiality. Even if the Council were to genuinely represent the interests of judges, its role in selecting members through a subordinate department would enable control over the Commission's activities and exert undue influence over judges.

3. **Linking Judicial Evaluation to Remuneration:** Another troubling proposal is the linkage between judicial evaluations and remuneration. International standards—such as Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, the Universal Charter of the Judge, and the European Charter on the Statute for Judges—prohibit any connection between a judge's salary and their performance. Such a link creates the possibility of pressure on judges, which may either aim to or result in influencing their decisions and behavior.

The position of the Association of Judges is also based on the following⁸:

- The Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), in its Opinion No. 17 titled "Evaluation of Judges' Activity, Quality of Justice, and Respect for the Independence of the Judiciary," noted that while regular evaluations may provide a general understanding of a judge's performance, such evaluations should not be conducted too frequently, as this could give the impression of constant oversight, potentially undermining the independence of judges.
- Similarly, international organizations prioritize the establishment of a permanent professional body composed of judges, which can effectively enhance confidence in the evaluation process.
- In this context the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia state that while a Judicial Council may play a role in defining the criteria and procedures for the professional evaluation of judges, the actual evaluation should be conducted at the local level and primarily by other judges.
- Additionally, according to the Venice Commission, the evaluation of judges should be conducted by a sufficiently independent and professional body. In its opinion on the initial draft of the RA constitutional law "Judicial Code of the Republic of Armenia," the Venice Commission welcomed the evaluation of judges by the evaluation committee of the General Assembly of Judges. The initially proposed composition of that committee included three judges from different courts, one former judge, and one legal scholar.

It is worth mentioning the Council of Europe Action Plan for Armenia (2023–2026), which, on pages 8, 25, and 26, underscores the importance of adopting a revised judicial code and introducing new methodologies and procedures for the Commission for the Performance Evaluation of Judges to provide reliable and impartial assessments of judicial performance.

The Action Plan emphasizes key areas, including the independence and efficiency of justice, as well as improving legislation and judicial practice. The Council of Europe is one of Armenia's primary partners in its efforts toward judicial reform. Since 2018, Armenia has made notable strides in this area, particularly through the adoption of a new Judicial Code and associated legal frameworks, alongside the development of an effective methodology for evaluating judges. Importantly, these advancements were made without undermining judicial independence. Furthermore, the professional capacity of the judiciary has been

⁸ CDL-AD(2014)007, Opinion no. 751/2013, Joint opinion on the Draft Law Amending and Supplementing the Judicial Code (Evaluation System for Judges) of Armenia, point 29, [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2014\)007-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2014)007-e) <https://rm.coe.int/no17-in-armenian-17-2014-/16808e6529>, §40

strengthened through enhanced access to resources and training, enabling more consistent adherence to European standards.

While reforms are necessary for improving the evaluation of judges' activities, there is growing concern that, once again, the opinions of professional judges and experts involved in the working group may be disregarded. Many fear that the draft law could be submitted to the National Assembly without adequate consideration of their input. If enacted without incorporating these perspectives, the proposed changes risk not only curbing the judiciary's independence but also tarnishing Armenia's international reputation.

In light of these developments, the Association of Judges has appealed to the Venice Commission with the aim of presenting its position on the legislative package and ongoing judicial reform processes.

6. Actions Weakening the Role of the Association

Unfortunately, during the reporting period, the executive and legislative branches have enacted judicial-related legislation in a secretive and non-transparent manner, bypassing the Association of Judges and excluding it from any discussions. This exclusion further underscores the government's intent to limit the influence and independence of the judiciary.

In recent years, high-ranking officials have publicly dismissed or ridiculed the Association, further marginalizing its role. Newly appointed judges are often covertly discouraged from joining the Association. Over the past year, dozens of judges have been appointed, yet none have applied for membership—illustrating a systematic effort to isolate the Association and weaken its influence within the judiciary.

A deliberate campaign by political authorities to obstruct the Association has also manifested in legislative changes. Recent amendments to the Judicial Code prohibit any public organization from using the term "judge" in its name. This change was clearly intended to target the Association, as its statute does not allow for a name change. Following the amendments, the authorities fined Azaryan, the president of the Association, for not altering the name. This matter is now being contested in the Administrative Court. Importantly, this law serves no legitimate purpose, as it only affects four inactive organizations using the word "judge," highlighting the targeted nature of these actions.

In addition to legal restrictions, the government has taken further steps to marginalize the Association's activities. It has removed the Association from the Commission for the Selection of Candidates for the European Court of Human Rights, assigning this role instead to an unrelated NGO, HCAV. The Association has also been excluded from discussions on key legislation affecting the judiciary and denied participation in meetings with international governmental representatives.

These combined actions demonstrate a concerted effort by political and governmental authorities to obstruct and potentially shut down the Association of Judges, thereby undermining its role in defending judicial independence in Armenia. The passage of these amendments without transparency or consultation not only weakens the Association but also threatens the long-term stability and autonomy of the judiciary itself.

7. Legislative Maneuvers for Personal Gain, Undermining Judicial Integrity

Karen Andreasyan, alongside his close associate and Minister of Justice Grigor Minasyan, has been spearheading legislative changes that prioritize group interests over legal principles and public interests within the judiciary. One such initiative aims to extend Andreasyan's own term of office, raising serious concerns about the manipulation of legal frameworks for personal benefit.

Another proposed change seeks to establish lifelong state pensions for non-judicial SJC members after only a few years of service. Notably, this proposal applies only to members who cease working after the law's enactment, thereby excluding those who have previously served⁹.

This legislation appears designed to benefit current non-judicial members, including Andreyan, Hayk Grigoryan, Yeranuhi Tumanyan, and Vigen Kocharyan. Their focus seems more aligned with securing personal financial gain than addressing systemic issues within the judiciary.

The justifications for these proposals reveal a troubling disparity: while judicial members of the Supreme Court retain their positions and guarantees, non-judicial members do not enjoy the same security. This inequity compromises the moral and psychological stability of the judicial system, as experienced judges find themselves competing unfairly against non-judicial members who are promoted without adequate merit

Additionally, in a bid to **boost his own public image**, Andreyan has resorted to **self-promotion at the expense of the judiciary's reputation**. His actions have undermined the independence of the judiciary, as he consistently uses **media platforms** to bolster his standing, often by **discrediting judges** and casting the judicial system in a negative light. These tactics not only erode public trust in the judiciary but also create a dangerous precedent where the judicial system becomes a tool for personal and political agendas.

In light of the serious concerns outlined above, **we appeal to our colleagues at the European Association of Judges to engage in a thorough discussion of this letter and adopt a resolution at the upcoming EAJ meeting** (the draft resolution is enclosed, which is open for reconsideration, refinement, and new suggestions, reflecting our commitment to collaborative dialogue).

We trust that the EAJ will carefully evaluate the concerns and recommendations presented, recognizing their importance not only for safeguarding judicial independence in Armenia but also for upholding the highest standards of justice and the rule of law across Europe.

We appreciate your attention to this urgent issue and encourage the EAJ to monitor and assess the evolving situation within the Armenian judicial system closely. A timely response from the EAJ, in the form of a statement or letter addressing the updated information provided, would be highly valued.

Sincerely,

The President of Association of Judges



Aleksander Azaryan

⁹ <https://armlur.am/1336919/>